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1. Introduction  
 
The ‘make or buy’ question (Williamson 1985) in relation to the provision of publicly-
funded health services is posed frequently in resource-poor settings.  Should a public 
bureaucracy be responsible for the provision of health services to the general public, or 
should the government contract-out the service provision function, while retaining 
responsibility for funding (Mills 1997)?   Whilst this is a direct echo of debates in 
developed countries such as the UK, the different motivations and context of such a policy 
in countries which are both resource- and information-poor suggest that the approach, 
outcomes and implications are likely to diverge from those in wealthier settings.  This 
chapter explores these issues, gives examples of the range of contracts and their uses, 
discusses how they can be evaluated and the nature of the evidence base, and identifies 
policy implications and research needs.  
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 Three key features of such settings affect the landscape for policy implementation, 
with implications for the type of contracts that can feasibly be used, and the manner in 
which they are likely to operate.  First, whilst in many developed countries contracts are 
used as a mechanism to reshape service delivery, usually between existing parts of a 
public sector bureaucracy, resource-poor settings often employ them as a way of 
expanding service provision and bringing in new providers.  Such providers are 
independent private entities, in contrast to the developed country providers who are not 
necessarily privately owned or profit-maximising (Bartlett and Le Grand 1993).  Second, 
the public sector bureaucracy is usually weak and overstretched (Bennett and Mills 1998), 
with implications for its capacity both to provide services and to fulfil a stewardship role 
and act as informed purchaser (WHO 2000).   Lack of government capacity also implies 
that the problem of “hidden information” (where uncertainty affects the performance of 
a task: see the chapter by Chalkley in this Companion) will be considerable for resource-
poor governments who lack information on the cost and quality of public and private 
service provision.  Thirdly, most low income country governments are dependent to a 
considerable degree on external finance, and this means that the agenda of the donor 
community can play a role in determining national policy: in effect the donor may be the 
purchaser, at least during the period of project funding.  Indeed, contracting-out service 
delivery to the private sector appears to be primarily favoured by the donor community 
rather than by countries: research recently undertaken for the UK Government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) has suggested that many governments 
actively distrust the for-profit private sector (Palmer 2005).   A further implication of the 
involvement of international funding agencies is that it can open the local market to 
international contractors such as international non-government organisations (NGOs). 
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2. The motivation for contracting out  
 
Whether espoused by donor or government, the rationale for contracting-out service 
provision to the private sector is varied, ranging from the theoretical to the pragmatic. 
Theoretically, the arguments are broadly similar to those put forward within the approach 
known as ‘New Public Management’ in developed countries (Walsh 1995).  The main 
objective is to improve efficiency of service provision and it is argued that either making 
clinics and hospitals residual claimants on revenues (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Gauri, 
Cercone & Briceno 2004), or exposing them to competitive markets through the 
establishment of renewable and competitive contracts, will achieve this aim.   The idea 
of giving incentives to providers by making them more autonomous is less relevant in 
resource-poor settings, where providers are often private and autonomous.  These private 
providers are commonly thought to be more efficient than public providers, though 
evidence on this, certainly at primary care level, is equivocal (Mills, Palmer, Gilson et al 
2004).  
Pragmatically, a number of arguments have favoured contracting-out policies.  
One key argument is that in many settings, public provision has failed altogether, or has 
widespread technical inefficiencies.  For example poor drug supply systems result in 
health facilities lacking drugs for a good part of the year; poor human resource 
management and remuneration systems result in high rates of health worker absenteeism 
and poor service quality (Hanson et al 2003).   Allocative efficiency is also judged to be 
poor: expenditure is skewed to hospitals, neglecting cost-effective primary care.   There 
are also widespread inequalities: resource allocation (both funding and staff) favours 
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urban areas.  Thus there is scepticism on the willingness and ability of the public sector 
to improve technical and allocative efficiency through direct provision and hierarchical 
management. 
Global attention has been focused on public sector failings, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa, by slow progress towards the UN Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) of reduced child and maternal mortality.   For example, if use of proven effective 
childhood services rose from current low levels to 99%, under-five deaths could fall by 
63% (Jones et al 2003).  Multilateral and bilateral agencies are thus seeking ways of 
rapidly ‘scaling up’ health services in a context of limited government capacity (Wagstaff 
and Claeson 2004).  Contracting-out offers a means of getting round limited government 
absorptive capacity, and resistance to changing resource allocation patterns and health 
worker employment practices. For example, financial incentives for good performance 
may be more readily introduced in contracts with private agents than in public 
employment policies.  
 Another pragmatic argument is that resources already exist in the private sector 
both locally and globally and can be rapidly mobilised through contracts.  Such resources 
include solo private practitioners, drug sellers, private hospitals, and NGOs such as 
church providers.  The latter may already receive government subsidies, but without a 
formal contract.  Evidence abounds that the majority of care-seeking, even for an 
important public health issue such as TB, is within the private sector (Uplekar, Pathania 
& Raviglione 2001), so these providers are widely acceptable to the population – usually 
more so than public providers. 
 Finally, it is argued that NGOs are better suited to delivering certain types of 
services, notably socially and politically sensitive ones such as those related to HIV/AIDs.  
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In some contexts, NGOs are argued to be more experienced and appropriate for working 
at community level, dealing with marginalised or at-risk populations, and addressing 
topics too sensitive for the government, such as illegal drug use. 
  Given these various contexts and motivations, the most common contractual 
arrangements are with private sector individuals, groups and organisations (for profit or 
not for profit) and for the provision of particular services and functions, across a defined 
geographical area.  We refer to this as ‘selective’ contracting with the private sector, 
because even in its most extensive form (e.g. district-wide contracting in some parts of 
Cambodia) it still falls short of a universal system.   While the purchaser is officially the 
government (national or local), in practice the contract is often initiated, funded and 
regulated by an external donor.  In some cases the donor may be instrumental in creating 
the local public agency that acts as the purchaser.   
 
3. Approaches to contracting-out service provision in resource-poor 
settings 
 
A range of different types of services and functions can be contracted-out (Table 1).   
Recent years have seen a particular growth of contracting services to NGOs.  Examples 
include contracting-out the management of public facilities e.g. in Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh; contracting community nutrition or health 
workers e.g. in Senegal and Madagascar (Marek et al 1999); and contracting-out a variety 
of preventive and palliative services related to HIV/AIDS, such as targeted services for 
high risk groups in Pakistan and India, and home-based care in South Africa.  More 
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traditionally, there have also been contracts with church hospitals in rural areas of many 
African countries e.g. Uganda, Malawi, Nigeria, Lesotho.   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
  
 Contracts vary considerably in formality and design.  In some cases the contract 
is little more than the formalisation of a subsidy from government to ensure that private 
providers continue to provide services in underserved areas.  In others, requirements may 
be more extensively specified, and payment may contain a performance-based element.  
The last few years have seen considerable development in the formality of contracts used, 
mainly driven by the procurement requirements of funding agencies.   
 
4. Contract evaluation 
 
Are any or all of these types of contract a good idea?  This question is difficult to answer, 
and remarkably few attempts have been made to address it comprehensively.    Contracts 
can be evaluated both directly and indirectly.   
Direct evaluation can attempt to look at the performance of providers, or results 
achieved in terms of volume, efficiency and equity of service provision.  These studies 
are difficult to conduct rigorously and few have been done.  They are often hindered by 
the need to have similar data on the ‘counterfactual’, or the efficiency and equity of 
service provision by any alternative provider, who may not actually operate in the same 
setting.  This means that there needs to be careful assessment of the study context in order 
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to understand whether findings are more widely relevant.  A recent review for the 
Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care Group (Lagarde and Palmer 2009) 
assessed the evidence on the effectiveness of contracting out healthcare services in 
improving access to care or health outcomes in low and middle income countries.  There 
were only three studies that met the relatively stringent criteria of the Cochrane Library 
(Ali 2005, Bloom 2006, Lavadenz 2001) and these suggested that contracting out services 
could increase access and utilisation.  However the authors of the review stress that the 
methodological weaknesses of these studies diminish the generalisability of their 
conclusions.  A second review (Liu, Hotchkiss and Bose 2007) sought to take into account 
the effect of contracting out on other outcomes such as equity, quality and efficiency.  
They conclude that whilst contracting out has in many cases improved access, the 
evidence on these other dimensions of performance is unknown.  In addition, the effect 
of contracting out on the overall system can be either positive or negative.  
Where research which attempts to measure such outcomes is not possible, indirect 
methods of evaluation can still be used.  In the early days of the UK’s quasi-market 
reforms, Bartlett and Le Grand (1993) suggested that a theoretical analysis can be 
undertaken that specifies the conditions that services need to meet if they are to succeed, 
and then a preliminary empirical assessment made of the extent to which these conditions 
appear to have been met in practice.  A second indirect line of enquiry examines the nature 
of contracts in practice, and whether they operate in the manner specified or foreseen 
(Palmer and Mills 2003; Palmer and Mills 2005).  This literature draws on Macauley 
(1963) and MacNeil’s (1978) work showing how contracts tend to become more 
relational and less transactional over time. In particular, it is suggested that contracts for 
health in resource-poor settings will tend to be relational where there are difficulties in 
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specifying the services to be delivered and a lack of competition in the award of contracts 
(Palmer and Mills, 2005).  This has implications for the way in which contracts will 
influence providers, and the ability of contracts to provide transparency and improve the 
efficiency or quality of service delivery.   Since contracts are often justified on the 
grounds that they are an effective mechanism for providing incentives or controlling 
providers, questioning whether this appears to be the case is an indirect way of assessing 
the value of contracting-out.  
The appropriate type of evaluation depends on the rationale for the contract in the first 
place.  For example, a contract may be introduced to increase access to services rapidly 
and efficiently, to create incentives for existing providers to become more efficient, or to 
buy services that otherwise could not be provided by the public sector.  Knowing to what 
extent contracting-out has been successful in each case implies a different type of 
evaluation.  For example, where contracts are used to scale-up services where there is no 
public provision or to purchase services which the public sector is not able to provide, it 
is irrelevant to compare relative cost and efficiency between public and private providers.  
If a contract is made with private providers on the grounds that they will be more efficient, 
evaluation needs to compare their relative efficiency with that of possible alternative 
providers. 
A further issue facing evaluation is what is feasible in terms of data collection or data 
availability.  Many contracts in resource-poor countries have not been in place for very 
long, or the lack of data on service delivery can make them impossible to evaluate.  An 
exception to the latter is the large externally funded contracting arrangements, some of 
which have provided a vehicle for research. 
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5. Examples of recent evaluations of contracting out 
 
This section selects several of the recent attempts to evaluate the performance of providers 
and the nature of contractual relationships, to give an in-depth insight into issues related 
to contracting-out service provision.  
 Two models of contracting for the delivery of district health services were piloted 
in rural Cambodia during 1998-2001 as part of a project funded by the Asian 
Development Bank.  Districts were selected randomly and assigned either to “contracting-
out”, “contracting-in”, or controls.   Under contracting-out, NGOs were given full 
responsibility for the delivery of specified services in a district, including drug 
procurement and hiring and firing of staff.  Under contracting-in, NGOs worked within 
the existing system to strengthen district administrative structures.  Control districts 
received no external support except a small subsidy towards service delivery.   Equity as 
well as coverage targets for primary health care services were explicitly included in 
contracts.  Pre- and post intervention household and facility survey data are available for 
evaluation of service delivery (Schwartz and Bhushan 2004a; Schwartz and Bhushan 
2004b).    Coverage of primary care services in all districts substantially increased over 
the study period, but all contracted districts outperformed control districts in terms of pre-
defined coverage indicators such as immunization and attended deliveries. Contracted-
out models outperformed contracted-in.  Much of the increase in health care utilisation in 
contracted districts was attributed to increased use by households of low socioeconomic 
status – children in the poorest 50% of households in the contracted districts were more 
likely to be fully immunized than those living in similar households in districts served by 
the government model of service provision (Schwartz and Bhushan 2004b).   However, 
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there may have been different resource flows to the different districts and the differences 
observed could be attributed to this.  In addition it is unclear to what extent the NGOs 
that held these few contracts would be able to replicate this performance over a larger 
scale, or could be substituted by other NGOs.  
A similar comparison between NGO and public sector service delivery has been 
attempted in Bangladesh (Mercer et al 2004).  During 1998-2003, the Bangladesh 
Population and Health Consortium, supported by DFID, funded NGOs to deliver an 
essential package of services through their own clinics. NGOs reported their activities 
quarterly and their performance was evaluated using indicators such as the vaccination 
status of children and deliveries attended by a qualified person.  Similarly compiled data 
from public sector clinics were not available, so to evaluate the performance of the NGOs, 
the authors compared selected health indicators with the latest estimates for Bangladesh, 
some of which covered earlier time periods.   NGO data indicated high coverage of 
reproductive and child health services, and low levels of child mortality, in comparison 
to the rest of Bangladesh.  Given the absence of any baseline data, it is not clear whether 
this was inherent to the areas where the NGOs were operating, although the authors 
attempted to control for this by tracking mortality rates: these demonstrated a clear drop 
since the commencement of contracts.   
More recently there has been a larger scale and longer running introduction of 
contracting out in Afghanistan.   After 2001, Afghanistan introduced a number of different 
contracting models as part of a strategy to increase access to a package of basic health 
services.    A recent analysis  (Arur et al 2010) finds that all forms of contracting in or 
contracting out were able to provide greater access to services than non-contracted 
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facilities. However the authors note that overall utilisation of basic services in 
Afghanistan still remains at a very low per capita level (0.5-0.8 visits per annum).  
In South Africa, a study evaluated the nature of contractual relationships between 
the state and private providers for primary care delivery, and found that formal aspects 
such as design, monitoring and resort to sanctions offered little control over the nature of 
the contractual outcome.  In a contract with private GPs, individual, social and 
professional factors, and motivation, played an important role in determining the nature 
of service delivery under the contract (Palmer and Mills 2003). A comparison of three 
different contracts showed that an urban-based private sector contract for a sub-set of 
primary care services operated very differently from rural public sector contracts which 
attempted to provide broader health care coverage.  Important environmental influences 
on contracts were highlighted, including the nature of the market, scope of services and 
involvement of a public purchaser (Palmer and Mills, 2005). The study suggests that 
service delivery under contract can be relatively unpredictable in a situation where 
contracts are not, or cannot be, closely specified.  The lack of government capacity to 
specify and monitor contracts closely in many resource-poor settings emphasises the 
importance of this point.  
Performance-based contracting has been suggested as one way of better aligning 
incentives so that problems of ‘hidden information’ are lessened, and the need for costly 
and difficult monitoring of performance reduced.  A recent review of the evidence on 
performance-based payment has concluded that performance-based is a popular term but 
one that needs a clearer definition (Eldridge and Palmer 2009).  It also highlights the risks 
associated with large scale use of performance-based incentives in fragile health systems, 
since achieving prescribed targets may not be within the control of providers, 
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discouraging competition for service contracts in the most disadvantaged and difficult 
regions. There are also concerns over ensuring the reliability of information used to pay 
out bonuses in resource-poor settings.  
Eichler, Auxila and Pollock (2001) reported the findings of a pilot scheme in Haiti 
(funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID)) which introduced 
performance-based contracts for NGOs providing basic health services.  Under the new 
system, which replaced a system of straightforward reimbursement for NGO expenditure, 
a portion (5%) of the NGOs’ historical budget was withheld but the opportunity was 
offered to earn that plus an additional 5% if performance targets were met.  A one-year 
pilot showed marked improvements in performance.   This type of approach was used in 
some of the models of contracting in Afghanistan.     
Another evaluation which has attracted much attention, notably for its prospective, 
quasi-experimental design, is that of the impact of pay-for-performance to treatment 
facilities on the use and quality of prenatal, institutional delivery and child preventive 
care in Rwanda (Basinga et al 2010).  In contrast to the Cambodian experience, 
comparison facilities had their input-based budgets increased to match the average pay-
for-performance payments to the intervention facilities, so separating the incentive effect 
from the resource effect.  Pay-for-performance was found to have a large and significant 
positive impact on institutional deliveries, child preventive care visits, and quality of 
prenatal care, but not on number of prenatal care visits or immunisation rates.  The authors 
suggest that these differences are probably due to the size of the financial incentives and 
the extent to which the provision of services is under the control of the provider rather 
than dependent on patient decisions.  
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6. Policy implications 
 
Studies have almost all suggested that contracting-out services can lead to improvement 
in service provision.  However, caution is needed in assuming this holds everywhere, for 
three main reasons.  Firstly, studies examine contracting-out in very specific settings, with 
little attention paid to the context in which they operate.  This makes it very difficult to 
know to what extent the same benefits will be seen in different settings.  In particular, 
some contracts apparently improved service delivery dramatically, but were introduced 
where public provision was virtually absent (eg Cambodia).  Whether contracted-out 
services outperform a functioning public sector cannot be answered in such settings.  In 
other studies there are problems of attributing the relative merits of contracted-out service 
delivery to the contracts per se, as opposed to unobserved factors.   
Secondly, many contracting arrangements are externally funded, with strong 
design and management input, and of limited duration.  Evaluations of locally initiated 
and managed arrangements, such as in Costa Rica (Gauri et al 2004) and South Africa 
(Palmer and Mills 2003), found that the contract did not appear to have a strong influence 
on service delivery and that many other aspects of the purchaser and provider were more 
important.  This echoes some of the findings of long-term contractual relationships in 
developed countries (Flynn and Williams 1997).  As yet there is no information on what 
might happen to externally funded and initiated contracting arrangements once the period 
of external funding ends.   
Thirdly, most contracting-out is at the moment still only on a small scale, and it is 
unclear to what extent private providers currently involved are representative of a larger 
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pool of potential contractors.  There are uncertainties over whether there are enough 
technically capable and motivated NGOs or private providers to cover all parts of a 
country, and how limited competition might affect contract performance over time.  The 
studies cited above demonstrate some of the difficulties in comprehensively evaluating 
the performance of contracts in resource-poor settings.  If contracting-out is seen as an 
alternative to public sector provision, there is a need for some comparison between the 
two types of provider, but data on public sector service delivery is very scarce.   Another 
problematic area is separating out delivery of a useful service such as community outreach 
from its roots in NGO provision: certain services currently delivered by NGOs are 
successful, but they may be equally so if they were delivered by government.   
 
7. Further research 
 
There remains a large agenda of further research.  If the desirability of contracting-out as 
a reform prescription is to be more strongly established, a focus on the relative 
performance of different providers and contracting models needs to be complemented by 
better understanding of the dynamics of purchaser and provider relationships and contract 
management, and of the nature and size of local and global markets for contractors.   
A further issue is the impact of contracting on the broader health system.  A key 
difference in the types of contracts described here from those in an internal market are 
that both contracts and providers may be numerous and small scale, with little 
standardisation across a country.  This runs the risk of fragmenting the health system and 
possibly creating substantial differences in provision from place to place.  Other issues to 
consider include how referrals operate in a contracted-out arrangement, how 
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accountability can be guaranteed with a number of small-scale providers, and lastly the 
transaction costs of managing contracts in a resource-poor environment. There is no 
evidence on these issues.   
In resource- and information-poor settings, external resources (both financial and 
technical) commonly support the purchasing role.  It is as yet unclear what would occur 
if this support is withdrawn, whether governments can continue contracting on their own, 
and whether it is cost-effective for them to do so.   One option which requires evaluation 
is contracting-out the purchasing function to a technically strong, independent body.       
Governments often face a choice of type of provider.  For example in South 
Africa, private GPs, NGOs, and commercial firms are all options for primary care 
contracts.    On theoretical grounds, there may be a basis for preferring not-for-profit 
providers in a context of weak purchasing capacity since it is generally assumed that non-
profit organisations are more trustworthy and motivated to provide services in the public 
interest, but these assumptions require empirical testing.    
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Table 1: Services that may be contracted out 
Category Examples 
Personal health services hospital facility 
primary care facility 
specific service 
laboratory tests 
Public health services vector control 
nutrition programme 
Non-clinical services 
 
pharmacy 
catering 
laundry 
cleaning 
maintenance  
security 
Management functions facility management 
personnel recruitment and employment 
purchasing 
 
 
 
 
